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NETWORK RESILIENCE ANALYSIS:
REVIEW OF CONCEPTS
AND A COUNTRY-LEVEL.
CASE STUDY
Abstract This paper presents the rationale behind performing an analysis of Internet re-
silience in the sense of maintaining a connection of autonomous systems in the
presence of failures or attacks — on a level of a single country. Next, the graph
of a network is constructed that represents interconnections between autono-
mous systems. The connectivity of the graph is examined for cases of link or
node failure. Resilience metrics are proposed, focusing on a single autonomous
system or on overall network reliability. The process of geographic location of
networking infrastructure is presented, leading to an analysis of network resi-
lience in the case of a joint failure of neighboring autonomous systems.
Keywords network resilience, valley-free path, autonomous system geolocation
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1. Introduction
The concept of disaster-related network vulnerability analysis results from the incre-
asing impact that networking services have on everyday life — not only in the sense
of human living conditions, but also in the sense of human life itself. Our dependen-
ce on networked equipment (not so obvious as in the case of, say, social networking
or online banking) has crept into areas that are critical to human survival. Medical
monitoring appliances, smart power grids, and air traffic control are just some appli-
cations which directly influence human safety; they all rely (or will rely) heavily on
a network, however, which is not directly operated by humans.
We should first clarify the meaning of the very term ‘resilience’, providing the
concepts and ideas encompassed by it. Here we focus on resilience defined as the
vulnerability of a network of autonomous systems (AS) located in a single country
to link or node failures. In this paper, we try to present practical solutions to the
problem of identifying Internet weak spots; i.e., parts of the infrastructure whose
failure could be really harmful. Solving problems of this type usually requires many
computing resources, unless extra assumptions are made. A handful of relatively-
simple technologies and publicly-available data does the work, letting one rank the
importance of network links as well as simulate the results of a disaster affecting some
area.
Intense research activity related to network resilience is going on, which can be
observed by the number of scientific publications and collaborative research projects
supported by governmental and international programs. The activities differ in their
focus on key concepts linked to the very term ‘network resilience’:
• evaluation — how resilience should be understood; what metrics should be picked
up to properly assess resilience; how measurement results should be interpreted
in practice;
• structure — what specific following aspects of network operation should be ad-
dressed, and in how much detail, in order to evaluate resilience properly: ISO/OSI
layers, systems hierarchy, physical location of devices, natural traffic, and topo-
logy variability in time;
• scenario — what kinds of network threats and responses to consider, and how to
model them;
• economy — what can be the cost of the desired resilience level, and how it relates
to the income model?
Let us address each of those concepts, respectively, by reviewing representative
— although not all — research contributions.
1.1. Resilience evaluation
The intuitive definition of resilience is how well it withstands challenges placed on it,
against infrastructure disruption, or traffic surge. More formal quantitative measures
place the requirement to maintain network graph connectivity or cohesion in case of
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a link or node failure, respectively [21]. The number of simultaneous failures resulting
in service disruption is the resilience metric in either case. Alternatively, one may
use the probabilistic approach, calculating service degradation upon the given pro-
babilistic models of traffic load and link failure. Such a probabilistic metric of traffic
loss due to low-level failures is proposed and evaluated in [21] for typical networking
topologies. The analysis is usually computationally demanding, as it is applied in mul-
tidimensional space; therefore, improvements are proposed, as in [22], to effectively
consider only the most probable failure scenarios. Here, the authors also consider link
capacities, which result in extra metrics defined as the link overload.
To address the inherent multi-criterial nature of resilience, aggregate measures
are proposed [29] in order to generalize the problem and provide a single performance
grade to the network operator. The authors argue that a single measure (like average
node connectivity) may be deceiving, so they propose using simple weighted means of
measurement with individual tolerance intervals. The work has been carried within
EC’s FP7 project ResumeNet [1], whose other remarkable paper [28] provides a vast
overview of previous works as well as sound classification of resilience-related issues.
The term resilience gets divided into challenge tolerance and trustworthiness. The
former means the ability to withstand: failures for internal reasons (termed “survi-
vability”), failures for external factors (“disruption tolerance”), and unusual traffic
patterns (“tolerance”). The latter provides users with dependability (so network se-
rvices are reliable), security of the data being sent, and a contracted quality of service
(QoS).
Remarkably, the report also addresses the question of classification and handling
of any resilience measurements, suggesting to bin them into three classes (with ap-
propriate action assigned to each of them). The authors propose an overall resilience
management framework on a general level.
1.2. Network structure
Analysis of network resilience is rarely done on the level of abstracted graph concepts
— even if this is the intention of Internet Protocol authors. To model correlated chal-
lenges (cf. also Sec. 1.3), one needs to reveal the underlying shared infrastructure. On
the other hand, to model application-level resilience or even inter-AS resilience, the IP
graph needs to be aggregated. There is economical rationale behind modeling a traffic
interchange between autonomous systems; however, the specifics of that interaction
adds extra complexity to the IP-level model.
The physical proximity of networking appliances is a special form of interaction;
network topology (in the sense of its geographical layout) plays a crucial role in case
of accidental damage as well as coordinated attacks affecting a specific area. Much
effort has been put in order of getting a precise estimation of network geographical
location. The seminal work [20] presents a number of specific technologies and data-
sets to establish a mapping an IP address, both to a region (e.g., a city) and to an
AS. An important observation is made on the correlation of router and population
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densities, which has been confirmed and elaborated further in [19]. Contrary to such
a passive approach, [30] suggests the deployment of active probes and application of
a precise-location algorithm based on triangle inequality, where distance is represented
by packet delay. The algorithm operation is based on a set of nodes with a precisely-
known geographical location (a.k.a. landmarks). This idea gets further developed in
[13], where a set of constraints is imposed on the distance vectors, and a maximum
likelihood approach is applied. The proposed algorithm is verified on the known Aka-
mai node locations in the US. In another example of statistical approach to node
geolocation [16], the authors use machine-learning techniques, considering delay and
its statistical properties, hop count, and population density as relevant model inputs.
Once having found the location of networking infrastructure, one is able to perform
an analysis of its resistance to natural disasters or geographically-extensive attacks,
as in [24] (where a bipartite graph approach is used to model network response to an
electromagnetic pulse attack).
Contemporary research on geolocation has specialized, as in [25, 23], on the lo-
cation of certain network resources as content delivery networks (CDN). The comple-
mentary task to infrastructure location is to locate mass users using that infrastruc-
ture as well — i.e., the so-called “eyeball networks.” Such focused research definitely
links the definition of resilience with the cost of resilience, which is addressed in
Sec. 1.4.
The geographical location of IP resources and AS-level network modeling are not
tasks to be addressed disjointly; one can find a good survey of relevant techniques
in [12]. Important issues in AS relationship are that they are asymmetric and non-
transitive: the mere fact that AS Y is located between X and Z does not imply that
traffic from X to Z goes through Y . One can examine BGP prefixes — but they
are usually incomplete and outdated and do not reveal the economy of relationships
(which may silently and efficiently prevent the use of sequence X → Y → Z). The
proper categorization of network nodes — and whole AS’s, depending on modeling
accuracy — as customers or providers is a necessary preprocessing stage in network
analysis. A number of approaches exist: the classification of AS to multi-tier hierarchy
levels based on BGP routing tables is presented in [15], while [18] uses social metrics
of network nodes to achieve the same goal. Resilience metrics for an inter-AS graph
with valley-free property is proposed and studied in [10]; practical suggestions are
given there about the most effective investments in resilience improvement on the AS
level.
Revealing the actual and precise structure of the Internet is as important as
learning its statistical properties. In the latter case, the information is used to generate
artificial networks with properties analogous to the real ones, and to appropriately
analyze their resilience — as in [8], where a model of Internet growth on the AS level
is constructed on the basis of real data. The proposed approach extends the Highly
Optimized Tolerance (HOT) model (used earlier) in which the new node’s choice about
which AS to join is based on AS centrality and proximity. The contribution allows
us to model an AS as a set of points of presence (POP), which may be joined. The
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main aim of yet another generator of inter-AS topology [6] is to reflect “local dense
cores”; i.e., clusters of nodes correlated with population density — and to model AS
hierarchy creation in such conditions. The approach needs extra arbitrary information
about region boundaries to the make the model accurate.
As it turns out in [27], metropolis or administrative units are not the only natural
phenomena to “attract” the location of networking equipment. A suite of tools for
physical location of network devices used in that research shows a clear correlation
of network density with overall technology penetration in the region, represented by
road or railway densities. Moreover, certain data paths are aligned with major com-
munication routes. This is an important observation, as a collocation of goods, energy,
and data transportation corridors adds up to network vulnerability to geographically-
extensive attacks.
A good summary of technologies for geographical location, inter-AS relationship,
and topology generation can be found in [17].
1.3. Network scenarios
The effects that various events have on the network are generally modeled in two
non-exclusive ways: i) as a graph of resource or risk dependencies that indicate event
impact on higher-level services; and ii) as a game played between the challenging and
network response forces. The former can be modeled in the form of a Bayesian belief
network [21]. A set of separate entities in higher layers that use common underlying
device (like VPNs running on a physical trunk line) is termed a shared resource
group (SRG). Upward propagation of risks is given adequate attention in previously-
mentioned works [22, 11], with the latter emphasizing that small local incidents can
develop into global malfunction, analogous to the butterfly effect in meteorology.
A good example of a complex, game-theoretic approach to model a challenge as
a sequence of actions and counter-measures can be found in [7]. The authors develop
an appropriate formalism for describing the interaction between the challenging and
defending parties. The resulting Markov graph of network states can then be used in
a quantitative assessment of systems resilience. Also, a similar but much-simplified
approach is applied in [26] for the specific case of interdomain routing with path costs
specified.
1.4. Economy of resilience
The issue of an economy model for providing resilience globally is rather omitted in the
literature. Some authors [10] postulate that it should be addressed adequately. The
most complete assessment of the current situation is contained in an ENISA report on
resilience [9]. This vast document is a comprehensive overview of all of the aspects of
resilience presented here thus far, aggregating important developments in the domains
of network modeling, resource localization, network dynamics, network generation,
and so on. As far as economical drivers for inter-AS resilience are concerned, virtually
none exist (except for strong ISP competition for demanding customers). In general,
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ISPs at all levels have no incentive to improve resilience individually: redundant links
or multihoming raise operational costs that are not compensated by additional income.
However, in the long term, network reliability matters for end users. It is one of
the reasons for migration — and its role will grow for those users sensitive to service
disruption. In general, this means all of us as we depend on the web more and more.
But it seems crucial for ISPs to select customers particularly keen on high-quality
networking — and to find ways to make them pay for resilience-related investments
and technology. As stated in [14], eyeball networks (i.e., broadband access networks)
connect users ready to pay for the rich content they receive. In this sense, they are
valuable equally to the ISP as well as the content provider. Thus, the point is revenue
sharing — if not in general, then in what relates to increased resilience, because this
guarantees undisturbed revenue for both business partners.
2. Network model
As much as everyone agrees upon using a graph for network modeling, everyone argues
about what data to use for graph construction. There exist several commonly-used
sources:
• Database of AS’s managed by RIPE [2]. The data consists of information declared
when registering an AS. They are updated relatively rarely. Of most value are
BGP export and import records, which allows us to infer neighboring AS’s and
their relationships; however, only a small part of that information is usually
implemented in BGP paths. The data also contains country information about
each AS and — sometimes but rarely — the street address of the AS legal site.
• BGP paths gathered by available Polish looking glasses together with the paths
collected by CAIDA [3] probes. This data, although live, is also usually superflu-
ous, while the set of paths in everyday use is usually much smaller.
• Team Cymru database [4]. In this work, IP to AS number mapping was used
to aggregate sites of interest to autonomous systems; also, a country-location
database helps us to complete information retrieved from RIPE and CAIDA.
Let us observe that a discrepancy between current inter-AS routing paths and
the possible relationships declared by AS’s are of the utmost importance in traffic
engineering or short-term failure prevention. For resilience analysis, all paths that
can be potentially set up in case of a breakdown are almost as important as the ones
currently used. That is why we stick with RIPE&CAIDA records in network graph
construction.
2.1. Network graph limited to a single country
We also have decided to model the network consisting of AS’s whose locations are
limited to a single country. Obviously, such simplification deprives the graph of AS’s
located abroad (along with links to them), thus weakening the overall connectivity.
However, there are sound reasons for doing that. Firstly, it allows the graph to remain
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reasonably small, allowing the application of an exact graph search method without
any heuristics. Even when applying methods that formally run in polynomial time
(but with high ‘big O’ exponent) to a large graph, it renders analysis impossible.
Secondly, the discarded foreign AS usually belongs to tier-1 or tier-2 operators, which,
in general, maintain very good mutual connectivity and do not affect the overall
network resilience much [10]. Thirdly, network resilience is usually under the care of
an appropriate national authority; maintaining people connected in case of a disaster
can, therefore, be achieved by legal, social, and economical measures — all of them
being executed on the national stage.
Table 1
BGP statistics at border routers for three different AS’s.
BGP paths AS X AS Y AS Z
a) total 186784 272905 987729
b) terminating in the country 4738 6835 12314
c) not contained in the country 826 271 108
d) ...but with alternative in the country 794 254 63
avg. number of foreign AS’s traversed in case c) 1.94 2.48 3.67
A quick check shows how much BGP paths connecting AS’s in a single country
rely on foreign infrastructure. Let us consider here (and throughout the rest of the
paper) the case of Poland. Such a choice was determined by the authors’ ability to
access relatively-much traffic-related data that is up to date. Table 1 presents how
many BGP paths that connect pairs of AS’s located in the same country traverse AS’s
that are located abroad. Path counts in rows a) and b) roughly correspond to the size
of X, Y , and Z (in the sense of exchanged traffic volume). Note that the percentage
of paths that have destinations in the same country but ‘detour’ the national core
in favor of providers abroad is not big; it ranges here from 17.4 to just 0.88 percent
(row c). Interestingly, the majority of such paths have their pure national alternatives
(row d), thus bringing a fraction of detouring paths to the edge of the error rate in
observed original datasets.
2.2. AS’s reachable via uphill paths
As mentioned in Sec. 1, the edges in a graph of AS interconnections should be attri-
buted to the proper type of inter-AS relationship, in order to correctly find feasible
paths. There exists four types of relationships that an AS may have:
P2C provider to customer — the AS acts as provider; it must forward all traffic ori-
ginated by the client AS (and its customers as well);
C2P customer to provider — the AS may forward all its own traffic, and the traffic
of its customers, upwards to its provider (this relationship is complementary to
P2C);
P2P peer to peer — two AS’s may exchange their own traffic (and the traffic of their
customers), but may not forward it using C2P links;
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S2S sibling to sibling — two AS’s act as a single unit, merely maintaining separate
AS numbers.
Let us now consider a graph consisting only of P2C/C2P relationships (an exten-
sion to a more general case will follow). A valid path connecting AS1 to AS2 must
contain a sequence of only C2P-type links, followed by a sequence of only P2C-links.
No more link-type alternation may happen. Observe also that the AS1-AS2 rela-
tionship is symmetric; i.e., the reverse path traversing the same sequence of AS’s
is also valid. Therefore, let us construct a graph G(V,E) consisting of vertices V
corresponding to AS’s and directed edges E, corresponding to all C2P links. For
a given vi ∈ V , the set of vertices vi it is weakly connected with is defined as
R(vi) = {vk : path from vi to vk exists in G(V,E)}. Let us call R(vi) a set of vertices
reachable from vi. For another vertex, v′i, the reachable set is R(v
′
i); if the intersection
R(vi) ∩ R(v′i) is not empty, then at least one valid path connecting vi and v′i exists.
The intersection of reachable sets contains the AS’s where the switch from C2P to
P2C on the connecting path happens.
We can measure network resilience by a calculation of reachable sets in case of
a single link or node failure. Consequently,
R(vi, ej) = {vk : path from vi to vk exists in G(V,E \ ej)} , (1)
R(vi, vj) = {vk : path from vi to vk exists in G(V \ vj , E−vj )} (2)
denote reachable sets in situation of ej or vj failure, respectively. (E−vj is the original
edge set with links to/from vj removed from it.)
2.3. Vulnerability measures
Computation of R(·) for all (vi, ej) or (vi, vj) pairs is affordable for medium-sized
systems, as it involves only several graph searches (which can be perfectly done in
parallel). With such statistics at hand, we can go for calculating some ranks for
individual links. Let us devise the following metrics:
uE(vi) =
∑
j∈E card(R(vi) \R(vi, ej))
card(R(vi))
, (3)
uV(vi) =
∑
j∈V j Ó=i card(R(vi) \R(vi, vj))
card(R(vi))
(4)
for assessing a relative decrease in the number of AS’s reachable from vi via C2P paths
— summed over all possible link (3) or node (4) failures. For AS’s poorly connected
with the Internet core, many failure scenarios cause a severe decrease of available
AS’s; hence, uE and uV will tend to be high.
For a more-accurate check of overall network connectedness (w.r.t., a given link
or vertex failure), one needs to check the resulting uphill paths against the downhill
paths — for all possible pairs of AS’s. If a set,
S(ej) = {(vi, v′i), i Ó= j : R(vi, ej) ∩R(v′i, ej) = ∅} , (5)
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contains all pairs of AS’s disconnected by ej failure, then we can use cardinality of S(·)
for ranking edges, finding those whose failures deteriorate network connectivity most.
This idea can be further developed by incorporating any extra information that could
be available (e.g., traffic matrix, AS importance) into the rank. The complementary
measure for node importance is card(S(vj)), with:
S(vj) = {(vi, v′i), i Ó= j : R(vi, vj) ∩R(v′i, vj) = ∅} , (6)
Sibling relationship can be handled by defining extra C2P links in both directions be-
tween AS’s. However, a trick is needed to handle the peering case without a change in
the apparatus presented above. We propose to represent every P2P link between AS1
and AS2 by two C2P links to an artificial AS acting as a provider. Such a proposition
makes some BGP paths longer than in reality, but it does not affect the connectivity
measure definition at all.
3. Assessing resilience in a real case
The specific graph that has undergone analysis was constructed from RIPE&CAIDA
data [2, 3], from which Polish AS’s were extracted. It consists of 1868 AS’s linked by
5390 edges of P2C/C2P type. There are also extra 24 AS’s connected to the rest of
the graph by P2P links only; the total number of P2P links in the graph amounts to
835. The results of that specific graph analysis are presented below.
3.1. AS-oriented analysis
Metrics proposed in (3,4) provide a comprehensive overview of the connectivity of
a given AS with the rest of the network. One can see in histograms in Figure 1 that
the vast majority of AS’s have uE(vi) measure value close to 1. This means that
a link failure on the uphill path deprives them on average of connectivity to only
one AS — the one that was connected via the faulty link. If the upward connectivity
to other AS’s remains intact in such a case, we can hope that connectivity to only
one of potentially many top-level providers is deficient, while there are alternatives
to maintaining connectivity with the rest of the network. The prevalent value of 2 for
uV(vi) can be explained in a similar way, for the fact that a single AS failure leaves
this AS unavailable by definition, plus the AS’s that are located directly behind
it. However, there exist nodes much more vulnerable to failure: four cases having
uV(vi) > 5; five more having uV(vi) > 4, and as many as 130 others with parameters
bigger than three — and analogous to uE.
Quite expectedly, the most vulnerable AS’s (w.r.t. both metrics) are exactly the
same ones. The top- (or rather bottom-) ranked AS belongs to a small local ISP
located in the countryside. For that specific AS, we have calculated the number of
unreachable AS’s along C2P paths — in the case of just a single link or AS failure.
The failures causing biggest losses are listed in Table 2. The cases are sorted by
disconnection severity; remarkable is the fact that as many as three individual link or
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Figure 1. Histograms of AS’s overall vulnerability to a single link or node failure — uE(vi)
on left , uV(vi) on right. Wide bars refer to a complete network graph; black peaks refer to
a graph with P2P relationships removed.
AS failures can cause a major disruption with that AS service. A further investigation
of this case should involve BGP paths and topology analysis (which lie beyond the
scope of this paper).
Table 2
Worst potential failure cases, ranked in terms of missing connections along C2P paths expe-
rienced by a specific AS. The specific AS is as vi — cf (3,4).
card(R(vi))− card(R(vi, ej)) card(R(vi))− card(R(vi, vj))
descending order descending order
136, 135, 134, 26, 20, 5, 136, 135, 134, 27, 26, 20, 12, 12,
4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 9, 6, 5, 5, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3,
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1,... 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1,...
Histograms in Figure 1 cover both cases of: a complete graph; and a graph from
which P2P links have been removed. Please note little importance of P2P connections
manifested in bar plots: forgetting them does not perceptibly change the statistics.
This feature results from the highly-hierarchical nature of the contemporary Internet,
where replicated transit agreements effectuating at the top of the hierarchy count
more for network resilience than peering agreements elsewhere.
3.2. Network-oriented analysis
When it comes to examining end-to-end connectivity measures defined in terms of the
number of AS pairs disconnected by a single link or single AS failure — cf. (5,6) — the
relevant histograms are given in Figure 2. Surprisingly, there is not a single completely
redundant link in the graph; a failure of any of them will result in some disconnection
of AS’s. Links tend to cluster into two groups; w.r.t., the effect of their failure on the
network, which are not so diverse after all (observe cardS(e)). Regarding AS failures,
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their failures have a much heavier impact on the network than link failures, reaching
3.6 · 104 disconnected pairs of AS’s, which is about 2% of all AS’s pairs possible.
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Figure 2. Histograms of number of all disconnected AS’s pairs in effect of a single link or
node failure — card(S(ei)) on left , card(S(vi)) on right.
We can conclude here that single AS’s exist that are vulnerable to single-link
disruption, thus failing to reach any of the top-level interconnection points (cf. cases
presented in Figure 1). However, from the point of overall network connectivity (in
the sense of connected AS pairs), the influence of a single AS failure is small, while
the influence of a single link failure is next to nothing. Such observations are in force
when infrastructure failures happen rarely and independently.
3.3. AS geographical location
In practice, links, interconnection points, and even whole AS’s happen to be collo-
cated. Tracing intricacies of infrastructure collocation is as valuable as it is difficult.
Layered network structure and ISP policies to hide physical topology make the task
of proper Internet resource geolocation practically impossible. As with many other
authors, we present here the results of our own trials to find geographical location
of infrastructure. We focus here on determining autonomous system location. Being
aware that many AS’s are, in fact, geographically extensive, we claim that conside-
ring small AS’s as confined to a small region is justified and useful in overall resilience
analysis.
Our approach assumes that infrastructure location in the case of small AS’s is
identical to their legal address. Such an address is sometimes provided for RIPE re-
cords, but it can be outdated if not absent altogether, particularly for small AS’s.
Fortunately, many national telecommunication authorities run their registries of tel-
cos. The data provided there is always accurate and up-to-date. In the presented case,
the national authority provides data for all 6456 issued telecommunication concessions
[5]. A fuzzy match of ‘clean’ data was done to RIPE records, with some name regu-
larization preprocessing, and the application of Levenshtein distance metrics of two
to four characters. Successful matching of over 30% of AS’s was done. Next, street
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addresses were mapped to geographical coordinates using Google Maps online API.
Eventually, 601 AS’s have been attributed with their geographical location, as shown
in Figure 3 (available on request from the authors). As observed by other authors, AS’s
density correlates well with population density (not shown), although with significant
exceptions (note the sparsely populated NE corner of the map where numerous AS’s
emerge in response to absence of adequate infrastructure of the incumbent telco).
Figure 3. Google map with AS geographical locations. Map Data c© Basarsoft,
GeoBasis-DE/BKG ( c©2009), Google, basado en BCN IGN Espan˜a.
3.4. Analysis of joint failures of neighboring AS’s
With AS location found, one may perform an analysis of the effects of joint failures
of AS’s located nearby. Let us define a cluster of radius r as a set of AS’s located
geographically within a circle of that radius. Such a definition may be quite useful in
terms of disaster effects: a weapon or a natural disaster with destruction range of r
could destroy all AS’s from the cluster.
For the simplest case, r = 0, we have 42 clusters on the graph. In this special
case, they are in fact collocated AS’s, in groups of two, three, or four. An analysis of
the effects of their failure follows the definitions (2,4,6) but with more than one vertex
removed from the graph. Failures of collocated AS’s may cause from 13,000 to 55,000
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AS pairs to stay disconnected; the latter number is quite significant as compared to
single-AS failure repercussions: see Figure 2 (right).
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Figure 4. Bivariate histogram of number AS pairs disconnected by
faulty clusters of varying radii.
Allowing bigger r = 100, 200, 400, 800 meters and, finally, 1.6 km yields many
more clusters whose failure consequences are obviously far more reaching. Naturally,
many of these clusters overlap. The effects, in the sense of the number of AS pairs
disconnected by cluster failures are presented in Figure 4. The failure cases have been
grouped in logarithmic bins; w.r.t., r and the number of disconnected AS pairs. The
most straightforward way to read the graph is to start with the assumed r; then
all possible damage scenarios with r are classified according to their effect on the
network, with bar heights representing the number of corresponding failure cases.
We can observe that choosing r to be 0, 100 or 200 m does not really impact the
overall damage to the network. This is because AS’s are either collocated exactly in
the same building or located far apart; in the other case, there is little chance to find
any neighboring AS’s within a radius of 100 to 200 meters. However, for larger r, we
denote rapid growth of disconnected AS pairs — 220,000 in the worst case; i.e., 10%
of all AS-to-AS relations. One must keep in mind that the location of only 30% of the
AS’s was done; with all equipment properly localized, the overall service deterioration
would probably manifest at a much smaller r.
4. Conclusion
This study is focused deliberately on resilience analysis of a single-country-sized ne-
twork. Statistics from several BGP routers show that relatively few paths connecting
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AS’s located in the same country would go through other countries. Thus, the resul-
ting AS graph (constructed from RIPE&CAIDA datasets) is of manageable size and
allows for the application of a standard graph-analysis method. We utilize the con-
cept of a set of reachable AS’s via customer-to-provider links (uplinks), determined
for each autonomous system — as well for a complete network graph as for a graph
with missing (or failed) links or AS’s. Here, the connectivity between pairs of AS’s is
the main metric for the network as a whole. We find that the overall network con-
nectivity in the considered case is rather sound; w.r.t., single element (AS or link)
failures. However, there exist peripheral AS’s without redundant links altogether. We
also find the importance of P2P links to be marginal.
In order to assess the impact of geographically-extensive failures, we reached for
well-established national registers to obtain street addresses of organizations that own
AS’s. A cursory expert overview of the geolocation results gives a good impression:
for small AS’s (but not only), the infrastructure is usually collocated with that orga-
nization’s legal address. However, this part of the analysis deserves a more-objective
evaluation. Performing a complete geographical location of resources is definitely a la-
borious but prospective task.
An analysis of joint failures of collocated AS’s shows that it may have a much-
greater impact on overall connectivity than individual ones. Expansion of a ‘fire radius’
that would destroy AS’s has noticeable effects only when large areas are affected
(800 meters or more). Alternatively, one can consider a vulnerability analysis for
joint failures of any number of links (or AS’s), without any assumption as to their
geographical location. In such a case, the measure (1) becomes R(vi,Ψ) = {vk :
path from vi to vk exists in G(V,E \ Ψ)}, where Ψ is a set containing faulty links.
Measure (2) and the following metrics can be defined analogously. Specifically, in
case of just two links failing simultaneously, in order to calculate e.g., (3), one has to
iterate over all possible failure scenarios. While it is a fairly laborious task, we checked
the results for the most-vulnerable AS in the test network, covered in Sec. 3.1 and
in Table 2. To make a vulnerability comparison between single-link and double-link
failures, (3) must get normalized by the total number of links or link pairs, respectively.
For such a vulnerability measure, we get the value of 9.2 · 10−4 for single-link and
4.7 · 10−3 for double-link failures. Those values are not proper probabilities yet, but
still provide a useful comparison. Quite expectedly, joint failures are on order of
magnitude more dangerous for network connectivity. Especially if the “failures” are,
in fact, orchestrated attacks.
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